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Federalist No. 10: Difference between revisions
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* Madison defines a "pure democracy" as a small, homogenous (alike) society that runs its own government | * Madison defines a "pure democracy" as a small, homogenous (alike) society that runs its own government | ||
* even a small, homogenous society will be subjected to "''the mischiefs of faction''" | * even a small, homogenous society will be subjected to "''the mischiefs of faction''" | ||
* even a small society will have a majority that will "sacrifice the weaker party" | * even a small society will have a majority that will have "inducements" (incentives or passions) to benefit itself and "sacrifice the weaker party" | ||
** or will be susceptible to "an obnoxious individual" | |||
* history shows that small democracies have succumbed to faction and have been "''spectacles of turbulence and contention''" | |||
** and are thus "''incompatible with personal security or the rights of property''" | |||
* "''Theoretic politicians''" who argue for this type of society "''have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time...''" all agree with one another and not divide into faction | |||
** by "theoretic politicians", Madison means utopian writers or philosophers | |||
** Madison recognizes that perfect political equality is impossible and that even if it were to exist it would succumb to faction | |||
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|<big>A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.</big> | |<big>A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.</big> | ||
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== | == Republic defined == | ||
* Madison defines a "republic" as a government run through a "scheme of representation" | |||
** i.e., citizens vote for representatives to run the government | |||
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|<big>The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.</big> | |<big>The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.</big> | ||
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== Democracy v. republic: delegation & size == | |||
* "points of difference" between them are: | |||
# how government is delegated (chosen) | |||
## in a republic = citizens select representatives ("''to a small number of citizens elected by the rest"'') | |||
# the size of the country | |||
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|<big>The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:</big> | |<big>The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:</big> | ||
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== Democracy v. republic analysis == | |||
* regarding delegation in a republic: | |||
** the will of the people (''"the public views"'') will be filtered ("refined") through representatives | |||
*** Madison supposes that those representatives will exercise "patriotism" and "love of justice" | |||
**** and will be "least likely" to abuse them due to momentary ("temporary") of self-interested (partial") motives ("considerations") | |||
** Madison asserts that the representatives will "pronounce" the "public voice" (will of the people") more consistent with the that will than the people themselves | |||
*** i.e., the will of the people if expressed directly via a democracy will be less consistent with the people's own "public good" than if expressed through elected representatives | |||
** however, Madison notes that even the republican form (representative) of government can be abused by intrigue and ambition | |||
*** "''Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages'' [votes of the people] ''and then betray the interests, of the people.''" | |||
* here Madison makes his core argument, that a larger ("extensive") republic will more likely elect leaders who will be "proper guardians of the public weal" | |||
** (i.e., leaders who will not abuse the rights of citizens and who will look out for the good of all the people) | |||
** he will then outline two reasons | |||
* '''<u>NOTE</u>: here Madison is countering the commonly understood idea that only a small, homogenous republic will not succumb to tyranny, and this argument is at the heart of Federalist no. 10''' | |||
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|<big>In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.</big> | |<big>In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.</big> | ||
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== Extensive republics: reason no. 1 == | |||
* even small republics must elect enough representatives in order to guard against a small group ("cabals of a few") of leaders who will conspire together | |||
* but, there must still be a limit on the number of representative so that it doesn't become like a pure democracy ("''to guard against the confusion of a multitude"'') | |||
* since the number of representatives would be in an equal proportion in either a small or large republic, the large republic would yield a greater number of "fit characters" (people of high moral character) from which the people may choose. | |||
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|<big>In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.</big> | |<big>In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.</big> | ||
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== Extensive republics: reason no. 2 == | |||
* with a larger base of representatives to choose from and with a larger voter population: | |||
** corrupt candidates will have less opportunity to corrupt elections | |||
*** "''it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious acts by which elections are too often carried''" | |||
** with more voters freed of corrupt elections, the voters will be more likely to elect representatives of high character ("''men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters"'') | |||
* Madison here argues that a larger republic with more competition will be less easily exploited by corrupt or self-interested politicians | |||
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|<big>It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.</big> | |<big>It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.</big> | ||