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Federalist No. 51: Difference between revisions
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<big>''''' FEDERALIST NO. 51''''' | <big>''''' FEDERALIST NO. 51''''' | ||
'''''The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments''''' | '''''The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments''''''''''New York Packet'', Friday, February 8, 1788''' | ||
'''''<big>To the People of the State of New York:</big>''''' | |||
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== Authorship == | == Authorship == | ||
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* "Different Departments | * "Different Departments | ||
** the branches of the federal government | ** the branches of the federal government | ||
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| '''''<big>TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.</big>''''' | | '''''<big>TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.</big>''''' | ||
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'''''<big>Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.</big>''''' | '''''<big>Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Next, he considers how the separation of powers will protect different segments of society from abusing the other. He accepts that "different interest necessarily exist", but without protection of the minority those interests will be abused by the majority. | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Majority encroachment of minority rights == | |||
Next, he considers how the separation of powers will protect different segments of society from abusing the other. He accepts that "different interest necessarily exist", but without protection of the minority those interests will be abused by the majority. | |||
* here we have a core argument for the federal system in that it will both | * here we have a core argument for the federal system in that it will both | ||
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|'''''<big>There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.</big>''''' | |'''''<big>There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|"This evil" = whereby the "majority be united by a common interest" (majority rule) and use that majority (51%) power to command / rule the minority (49%) | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Protecting minority rights: hereditary rule == | |||
"This evil" = whereby the "majority be united by a common interest" (majority rule) and use that majority (51%) power to command / rule the minority (49%) | |||
Madison cites two "methods" to prevent "this evil: | Madison cites two "methods" to prevent "this evil": | ||
* "creating a will" that is not solely representative of the | * "creating a will" that is not solely representative of the majority | ||
* dividing and separating "descriptions" (i.e. combinations) so that no single faction can obtain a complete majority | ** i.e., monarchies ("hereditary or self-appointed authority" | ||
* dividing and separating "descriptions" (i.e. combinations) so that no single faction can obtain a complete majority | |||
* Madison rejects protection of minority rights via hereditary rule (monarchy) as "precarious" | |||
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'''''<big>The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government.</big>''''' | '''''<big>The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under the same government.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Minority rights will be protected by the separation and division of powers | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Protecting minority rights: separation of powers == | |||
Minority rights will be protected by the separation and division of powers | |||
* protection from "combinations of the majority" | * protection from "combinations of the majority" | ||
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'''''<big>This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased.</big>''''' | '''''<big>This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|The "federal" form of government will protect from states that may "combine" to control the others or create regional alliances | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Federal Authority to prevent combinations of states == | |||
The "federal" form of government will protect from states that may "combine" to control the others or create regional alliances | |||
* the idea that every state is equal to one another in modern America seems logical; however, regional alliances, as such that led to the Civil War, were of great concern to the Founders. | * the idea that every state is equal to one another in modern America seems logical; however, regional alliances, as such that led to the Civil War, were of great concern to the Founders. | ||
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|'''''<big>Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.</big>''''' | |'''''<big>Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Justice is the purpose of government | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Justice is the purpose of government == | |||
* If one faction is allowed to dominate others, there will be no justice | * If one faction is allowed to dominate others, there will be no justice | ||
* just as strong people may use government to control the weak | * just as strong people may use government to control the weak | ||
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'''''<big>It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it.</big>''''' | '''''<big>It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Madison uses the example of Rhode Island, one of the smallest states, to make the point that if the states remained independent, factions would more easily control those states themselves and thus jeopardize the rights of the people and the independence of each state. | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Factions within states more likely without federal government == | |||
Madison uses the example of Rhode Island, one of the smallest states, to make the point that if the states remained independent, factions would more easily control those states themselves and thus jeopardize the rights of the people and the independence of each state. | |||
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'''''<big>In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.</big>''''' | '''''<big>In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Here is a central point that Madison in justifying the federal system: | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
== Protection in the "Extended Republic" or "the larger society" == | |||
Here is a central point that Madison in justifying the federal system: | |||
* that an "extended republic" (i.e., geographically large and heterogenous as opposed to a "small republic" that is homogenous) protects against a "coalition of the majority" to take over and abuse the rights of a minority | * that an "extended republic" (i.e., geographically large and heterogenous as opposed to a "small republic" that is homogenous) protects against a "coalition of the majority" to take over and abuse the rights of a minority | ||
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'''''PUBLIUS'''''. | '''''PUBLIUS'''''. | ||
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All the Federalist papers were signed "Publius," a reference to a founder of the Roman republic | |||
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