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Federalist No. 51: Difference between revisions
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'''''<big>There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. :</big>''''' | '''''<big>There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place that system in a very interesting point of view. :</big>''''' | ||
| style="background-color:#ffffe6" cell | | | style="background-color:#ffffe6" cell |Note: the ideas of a "republican" form of government in the states was generally accepted, the questions being the nature of the relationship between the states and any central government. The anti-federalists feared a strong central government and preferred the existing "confederation" (a loose federation, or joining of states) as opposed to a "federation," which,as proposed in the Constitution, would be a much stronger central government, and which Madison here calls a "federal system". | ||
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* here we have a core argument for the federal system in that it will both | * here we have a core argument for the federal system in that it will both | ||
** allow for majority rule | ** allow for majority rule | ||
** while also limiting | ** while also limiting that majority rule through separation of powers and checks and balances | ||
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|'''''<big>There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.</big>''''' | |'''''<big>There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.</big>''''' | ||
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'''''<big>This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased.</big>''''' | '''''<big>This view of the subject must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the stability and independence of some member of the government, the only other security, must be proportionately increased.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|The "federal" form of government will protect from states that may "combine" to control the others or create regional alliances | ||
* the idea that every state is equal to one another in modern America seems logical; however, regional alliances, as such that led to the Civil War, were of great concern to the Founders. | |||
* Madison argues here that a "proper federal system" would protect against such "oppressive combinations" which would otherwise "diminish" the "rights of every class of citizens" and "some member of the government" (i.e., a state) | |||
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|'''''<big>Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.</big>''''' | |'''''<big>Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.</big>''''' | ||
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'''''<big>It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it.</big>''''' | '''''<big>It can be little doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Madison uses the example of Rhode Island | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Madison uses the example of Rhode Island, one of the smallest states, to make the point that if the states remained independent, factions would more easily control those states themselves and thus jeopardize the rights of the people and the independence of each state. | ||
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'''''<big>In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.</big>''''' | '''''<big>In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself. It is no less certain than it is important, notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Here is a central point that Madison in justifying the federal system: | ||
* that an "extended republic" (i.e., geographically large and heterogenous as opposed to a "small republic" that is homogenous) protects against a "coalition of the majority" to take over and abuse the rights of a minority | |||
* the reason for this is that the "variety of interests, parties, and sects" that are "embraced" (part of) a large republic would diminish the ability of a majority coalition to form | |||
* additionally, since a minor party will be less afraid of a large major party, it will have "less pretext" to protect itself | |||
* which means that extreme measures would not be necessary to protect minor parties, resulting in "a will not dependent" on them | |||
* a "larger society," Madison argues, is therefore more capable of self-government (republican), given the protections built in to the "federal principle" that he outlines in the essay. | |||
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'''''PUBLIUS'''''. | '''''PUBLIUS'''''. | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | ||
all the Federalist papers were signed "Publius," a reference to the Roman | all the Federalist papers were signed "Publius," a reference to a founder of the Roman republic | ||
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