4,620
edits
Federalist No. 51: Difference between revisions
no edit summary
No edit summary |
No edit summary |
||
| Line 143: | Line 143: | ||
In a "single" republic, i.e, with a single national and no local governments, the only protection against abusive governance is the separation of powers within that government. | In a "single" republic, i.e, with a single national and no local governments, the only protection against abusive governance is the separation of powers within that government. | ||
However, in a "compound republic," Madison reasons, the power of the government that the people "surrender" to it (i.ei., affirming that all power resides in the people) will be safeguarded (protected) by the separation, division and balances of power between the "distinct and separate departments", i.e. state and federal governments and checks and balances within each. | |||
* Madison thereby defines the "federal" system of both states and central government as an additional protection against governmental abuse | |||
* He calls this a "double security" of the rights of the people in that the "different governments will control each other and that each will be controlled by itself" | * He calls this a "double security" of the rights of the people in that the "different governments will control each other and that each will be controlled by itself" | ||
| Line 151: | Line 152: | ||
'''''<big>Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.</big>''''' | '''''<big>Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Next, he considers how the separation of powers will protect different segments of society from abusing the other. He accepts that "different interest necessarily exist", but without protection of the minority those interests will be abused by the majority. | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|Next, he considers how the separation of powers will protect different segments of society from abusing the other. He accepts that "different interest necessarily exist", but without protection of the minority those interests will be abused by the majority. | ||
* here we have a core argument for the federal system in that it will both | |||
** allow for majority rule | |||
** while also limiting its rule through separation of powers and checks and balances | |||
|- | |- | ||
|'''''<big>There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.</big>''''' | |'''''<big>There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties.</big>''''' | ||
|cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"| | |cell style="background-color:#ffffe6"|"This evil" = whereby the "majority be united by a common interest" (majority rule) and use that majority (51%) power to command / rule the minority (49%) | ||
Madison cites two "methods" to prevent "this evil: | |||
* "creating a will" that is not solely representative of the marjority | |||
* dividing and separating "descriptions" (i.e. combinations) so that no single faction can obtain a complete majority | |||
|- | |- | ||
| | | | ||