Common historical fallacies: Difference between revisions - A+ Club Lesson Planner & Study Guide

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**** but most of those who did not produce cotton worked to support the cotton economy

**** as did poor whites

*** note that by 1850 95% of the cotton crop was with by slave-labor

**** (see https://www.jstor.org/stable/40056471 fn 1)

* sources:

** http://pressbooks-dev.oer.hawaii.edu/ushistory/chapter/the-economics-of-cotton/

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** https://networks.h-net.org/node/11465/discussions/4297558/poor-whites-antebellum-us-south-topical-guide

==== fallacy: large cotton plantations were more profitable than other economic activities ====

==== ~~logical~~ fallacy 1: slave-produced exports were the driving force of the antebellum U.S. economy ====

* cotton created enormous wealth for southern plantation owners (which was severely unequal across free whites)

* while cotton represented a significant portion of antebellum exports,

* however, historians estimate from 4-10% profits on cotton farming

** for example, one small farmer who owned several slaves was able to achieve 10.6% rate of return on his cotton crop and slave/hired labor in 1860

*** see J. William Harris (1990)<ref>Harris, J. William. “The Organization of Work on a Yeoman Slaveholder’s Farm.” ''Agricultural History'', vol. 64, no. 1, Agricultural History Society, 1990, pp. 39–52, <nowiki>http://www.jstor.org/stable/3743181</nowiki>.</ref> https://www.jstor.org/stable/3743181

* >> to expand

* Conclusion: opportunity costs:

** investments were recycled back into cotton at

** the focus on slaveholding created a dead-weight loss

*** << to expand/ explain

==== fallacy: slave labor was more efficient than free labor ====

* historians Fogel and Engerman argued that the "gang system" of large groups of slaves working in conjunction was responsible for increased cotton harvest efficiencies

** economists Olmstead and Rhode (2008)<ref>Olmstead, Alan L., and Paul W. Rhode. “Biological Innovation and Productivity Growth in the Antebellum Cotton Economy.” ''The Journal of Economic History'', vol. 68, no. 4, [Economic History Association, Cambridge University Press], 2008, pp. 1123–71, <nowiki>http://www.jstor.org/stable/40056471</nowiki>.</ref> point out that

*** plantation owners managed and recorded picking per slave or free worker, not as groups

*** if the "gang system" was more efficient, we would expect its more widespread use, but evidence does not indicate it

*** furthermore, harvesting efficiencies peaked and flattened around 1850, despite increase in plantation sizes and its geographic spread

*** per worker "picking rates" increased and did not decrease following the Civil War and emancipation

*** the economist tracked picking rates per cotton variety and found a distinct advantage in certain varieties

** economist Robert A. Calvert (1970)<ref>Calvert, Robert A. “Nineteenth-Century Farmers, Cotton, and Prosperity.” ''The Southwestern Historical Quarterly'', vol. 73, no. 4, Texas State Historical Association, 1970, pp. 509–38, <nowiki>http://www.jstor.org/stable/30236597</nowiki>.</ref> reported significantly higher picking rates in post-Civil War, even before introduction of mechanization in the late 1880s

*** see https://www.jstor.org/stable/30236597

* Olmstead and Rhode argue that increased cotton harvesting efficiencies in to the late antebellum period were the result of new cotton varieties:

** planters constantly experimented with different varieties, seeking higher yields, pest resistance and ease of harvest

** implications of new varieties:

*** prior to their introduction, the extend of planting was limited to harvest labor capabilities

**** i.e., harvesting was the constraint upon production (limited its extent)

*** the new cottonseed varieties allowed for expansion of those harvesting capabilities

**** as the cost of their seeds rose, which further gave advantage to large plantations

* the implication is that the supremacy of the slave plantation was not due to labor efficiency but to allocation of assets and investment instead focused on large plantations

** as yeoman farmers moved west, they built cotton farms, especially in Texas

** however, they were quickly followed by large planters who bought the best land, making it unavailable to small farmers

** advantages of slave labor were therefore derived of scale and not efficiencies in scale

* see

** https://www.jstor.org/stable/40056471

** https://www.jstor.org/stable/26217427

*** https://www.jstor.org/stable/3741275

* Sidenote on farming efficiencies and sharecropping:

** a significant consequence of industrialization was to raise the cost of farming itself with

*** machinery

*** fertilizers

*** specialized seeds

** these costs further entrenched former slaves in the sharecropper system

** see Mauldin (2017)<ref>MAULDIN, ERIN STEWART. “Freedom, Economic Autonomy, and Ecological Change in the Cotton South, 1865–1880.” ''Journal of the Civil War Era'', vol. 7, no. 3, University of North Carolina Press, 2017, pp. 401–24, <nowiki>https://www.jstor.org/stable/26381451</nowiki>.</ref>

==== fallacy: slave-produced exports were the driving force of the entire antebellum U.S. economy ====

* while cotton represented a significant portion of antebellum exports,

* and while cotton was the dominant slave-produced southern agricultural product,

** not all cotton was produced by slaves/ slave owners;

** exports were not a significant portion of the overall U.S. antebellum economy

** production and exports of cotton increased significantly after the Civil War and emancipation

* Conclusion: slavery was not the "driving force" or basis of the slavery-era American economy

*Conclusion: slavery was not the "driving force" or basis of the slavery-era American economy

click EXPAND to view chart of US exports as portion of the economy, 1790-1860: