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Federalist No. 10: Difference between revisions
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*** his logic here is that a "when a majority faction" is elected, it is more likely to | *** his logic here is that a "when a majority faction" is elected, it is more likely to | ||
**** succumb to its "ruling passion" (i.e. serve it's own interests) | **** succumb to its "ruling passion" (i.e. serve it's own interests) | ||
**** and thereby "sacrifice... both the public good and the rights of other citizens" | **** and thereby "''sacrifice... both the public good and the rights of other citizens''" | ||
* Madison calls the protection of the minority from the "ruling passion" of a majority the "great object" of his "inquiry" | * Madison calls the protection of the minority from the "ruling passion" of a majority the "great object" of his "inquiry" | ||
* vocabulary: | * vocabulary: | ||
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|<big>By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.</big> | |<big>By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.</big> | ||
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== | == Two methods to control faction == | ||
* faction may be controlled by either | |||
** 1. the majority must not have the "same passion or interest" | |||
*** i.e., the ruling majority is not made up of a single faction | |||
** 2. a majority that is a uniform faction must be prevented from acting on it | |||
*** i.e., "''unable to concert'' [join together] ''and carry into effect schemes of oppression''" | |||
*** because of a lack of "numbers" and "local situation" (i.e., location or due to some cause that keeps them from acting "in concert") | |||
* Madison notes that if "''the impulse and the opportunity ...'' [do] ''coincide''" | |||
* then we cannot expect that morality or religion ("motives") to control faction | |||
** worse, morality and religion "lose their efficacy" (their ability to stop or moderate abusive behavior) when a faction increases in their numbers who are acting "in concert" | |||
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|<big>From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.</big> | |<big>From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.</big> | ||
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== | == "Pure democracy" susceptible to faction == | ||
* Madison defines a "pure democracy" as a small, homogenous (alike) society that runs its own government | |||
* even a small, homogenous society will be subjected to "''the mischiefs of faction''" | |||
* even a small society will have a majority that will "sacrifice the weaker party" | |||
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|<big>A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.</big> | |<big>A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.</big> | ||