Landmark Supreme Court cases: Difference between revisions

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|1919
|1919
|Hughes
|Hughes
|"clear and present danger"
|<nowiki>- right to speech (1st amendment)</nowiki>
- restriction on speech
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* unanimous decision that upheld laws that restricted anti-draft protests/ flyers during WWI were legal restrictions of the right to speech
* the court reasoned that the criticisms of the draft were designed to induce others to commit a crime (resisting the draft) and would present a "clear and present danger" to the war efforts
* created the "clear and present danger" test for laws that limit First Amendment rights to speech and the press
* Justice Holmes' opinion included the phrase "falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic," which is used to illuminate criminal speech
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* [[wikipedia:Abrams_v._United_States|Abrams v. United States]] (1919: upheld a law that made it illegal to advocate for obstruction to the war efforts)
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* [[wikipedia:Brandenburg_v._Ohio|Brandenburg v. Ohio]] (1969: partially overturned Schenck by creating the "imminent lawless action" standard that was stricter than the "clear and present danger" test)
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|Shaw v. Reno
|Shaw v. Reno
|1993
|1993
|Rehnquist
|<nowiki>- redistricting and gerrymandering</nowiki>
|equal protection (14th amendment)
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* ruled that redistricting based on race (i.e. creating voting districts based on the race of the inhabitants) must meet the "strict scrutiny" standard (be carefully examined and measured for purpose and effect)
* however, the Court held that states must take into account race in adherence to the Voting Rights Act of 1965
* the case was about a Federal government-ordered redistricting of a North Carolina district that had been gerrymandered to create a black-majority district; at the time, North Carolina was operating under desegregation-era Federal oversight that was to protect minorities; the government ordered the state to create two black-majority districts, the 2nd of which would have been 160 miles long and geographically odd
* the court ruled that the proposed district was clearly designed only with race in mind, which violated the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause
* dissenting judges noted that the strict scrutiny therefore applied to districting that advantaged blacks but not other non-racial groups and also that no voter was disenfranchised (not allowed to vote) by the districting plan
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* Miller v. Johnson (1995: addressed racial gerrymandering that had created a "geographic monstrosity" in order to have a black-majority of voters)
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|Tinker v. Des Moines
|Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
|1969
|1969
|Warren
|<nowiki>- protests in public schools</nowiki>
- public safety (protecting children) v. rights of minors
- "substantial disruption" test
|<nowiki>- 1st amendment </nowiki>
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* students who wore armbands to protest the Vietnam War were suspended by the school for violating a rule that was created specifically for this protest
* the court held that the "silent symbol" of the armbands was not disruptive and the conduct of the students did not "materially and substantially interfere" with school operations or discipline
* and that even if they caused "discomfort and unpleasantness" in those who disagreed with them, the rights of the students
* the court allowed for circumstances in which student speech might cause disruptions
* the court created a "substantial disruption" test
* two justices dissented, including Justice Black who stated that "symbolic speech" was not a protected 1st amendment right and that people do not have a particular right to speak any "where" and "when" they please
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* [[wikipedia:West_Virginia_State_Board_of_Education_v._Barnette|West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette]] (1943: outlawed rules or laws that force students to say the Pledge of Allegiance or to salute the flag)
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* [[wikipedia:Miller_v._California|Miller v. California]] (1973: created the "Miller Test" for obscene materials, which may be legally banned)
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|United States v. Lopez
|United States v. Lopez
|1995
|1995
|Rehnquist
|validity of Commerce clause based on substantial effect on interstate commerce
|Commerce clause (Article I, section 8)
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* by 5-4 vote, the Court struck a federal law that banned gun possession  within 1,000 feet of a school; Congress justified the law under its powers derived from the Commerce class (power to regulate inter-state commerce), under the theory that guns were commonly sold across state lines
* it was the first case since 1937 in which the Court held that the government had exceeded its powers under the Commerce clause
* Chief Justice Rehnquist set three standards for Federal regulation under the Commerce clause:
# the use of interstate channels for commerce
# instrumentality of interstate commerce (people or things that inherently engage in interstate commerce, such as an automobile or airplane)
# substantial impact on or relation to interstate commerce
* Justice Breyer's dissent argued that Congress was justified under the Commerce Clause because the economy might be impacted by gun violence that impaired education
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* [[wikipedia:Wickard_v._Filburn|Wickard v. Filburn]] (1942: expanded the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause; the issue of the case regarded whether or not Congress could regulate planting of corn, and the Court decided that since corn is sold across the country, even local planting of it impacts that commerce)
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* [[wikipedia:United_States_v._Morrison|United States v. Morrison]] (2000: similarly ruled that an act of Congress exceeded the powers granted Congress by the Commerce clause, in this case because the part of the law that the Court struck down was not directly related to economic activity)
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|Wisconsin v. Yoder
|Wisconsin v. Yoder
|1972
|1972
|Burger
|<nowiki>- parental rights </nowiki>
- freedom of religion
|Free exercise of religion clause (1st amendment)
- incorporation case (via the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause)
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* the Court ruled that the First Amendments protection of the "free exercise" of religion supersedes (is more important than) the public interest in laws that create compulsory (required) school attendance
* three Amish families argued that laws forcing their children to attend school past the 8th grade violated their religious belief
* the court ruled that not educating children past 8th grade created no burden upon society and thereby protecting the individual right to religion is the higher priority
* in his dissent, Justice Douglas argued that the case regarded parental rights and not the children's exercise of their religion (Justices Steward and Brennan responded that the children were following their parents' religion)
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* [[wikipedia:Reynolds_v._United_States|Reynolds v. United States]] (1878: found that religious duty was not a defense against illegal actions; the case regarded a man charged with bigamy (having multiple wives); Davis v. Beason, 1890 ruled that laws against bigamy did not violate the 1st Amendment's Free Exercise clause
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* while not directly related to other cases, Yoder has been used as a basis for the parental right to homeschool or find alternatives to traditional schooling for children
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=== Burger ===
=== Burger ===


=== Rhenquist ===
=== Rehnquist ===


=== Roberts ===
=== Roberts ===
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=== Court Doctrines ===
=== Court Doctrines ===
* "One person one vote" standard (Baker v. Carr, 1961)
* Political Question doctrine
* Strict scrutiny
** the idea that any limitation on "equal protection of the laws" (14th amendment) must be strictly scrutinized (carefully examined)
** or that a law must carefully examined and measured for its purpose and effects


=== Legal Tests & Rules ===
=== Legal Tests & Rules ===


* "'''Grave and irreparable danger standard''' "(NY Times v. US, 1971)
* <u>clear and present danger</u> (Schenck v. US , 1919)
** speech that creates a "clear and present danger" may be prohibited by law
* "<u>grave and irreparable danger</u> rule "(NY Times v. US, 1971)
** updated from the "grave and probable danger" rule (Dennis v. US, 1951)
** updated from the "grave and probable danger" rule (Dennis v. US, 1951)
** the government must show "irreparable" (unfixable) danger in order to justify "prior restraint"
** the government must show "irreparable" (unfixable) danger in order to justify "prior restraint"
*** "prior restraint" = stopping an action or behavior before it happens, usually referring to halting the publication of something that might pose a harm to national security
*** "prior restraint" = stopping an action or behavior before it happens, usually referring to halting the publication of something that might pose a harm to national security
* '''Undue burden standard'''
* <u>imminent lawless action</u> standard (Brandenburg v. Ohio, 1969)
** in order to restrict speech, the government must demonstrate that the speech will produce "imminent lawless action," i.e., an illegal act that will be the direct result of the speech
* <u>Miller Test</u> (Miller v. California, 1973)
** modified a previous test for obscenity, "utterly without socially redeeming value"
*** to lacking "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"
***
* <u>substantial disruption</u> test (Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969)
** a standard for school prohibitions of student speech that may be considered lewd, offensive or disruptive
* <u>Undue burden</u> standard
** a law must not create an "undue" (unnecessary) or overly burdensome or that is overly restrictive of fundamental rights
** a law must not create an "undue" (unnecessary) or overly burdensome or that is overly restrictive of fundamental rights