Federalist No. 51: Difference between revisions

why NY
(fixing structure and sections)
(why NY)
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** John Jay (5 articles: Nos. 2–5 and 64).
** John Jay (5 articles: Nos. 2–5 and 64).
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| <big>'''From the ''New York Packet'', Friday, February 8, 1788'''</big>
| <big>'''''New York Packet'', Friday, February 8, 1788'''</big>
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"New York Packet" = a newspaper
"New York Packet" = a newspaper
* the Federalists letter were published in several newspapers
* the Federalists letter were published in several New York newspapers
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== Addressed to the people of New York ==  
== Addressed to the people of New York ==  
New York State was the primary battleground for the arguments over adopting the proposed Constitution.
New York State was a battleground for the arguments over adopting the proposed Constitution because of strong anti-federalist sentiment, including the Governor at the time, George Clinton. While the ''Federalist'' (so-called at the time) was reprinted elsewhere, it's largest circulation was in New York, so it is unclear the extent to which it influenced other states, such as Pennsylvania which ratified the Constitution amidst the publication of the ''Federalist Papers.''
 
 
Regardless of their direct impact upon the ratification of the Constitution, the ''Federalist Papers'' magnificently laid out the logic, reasons, and purposes of the proposed Constitution and have ever since been used by historians, the Courts, and the federal and state governments for guidance and clarification of the meaning of the Constitution.  
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| '''''<big>TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.</big>'''''
| '''''<big>TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea, I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct judgment of the principles and structure of the government planned by the convention.</big>'''''