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Federalist No. 10: Difference between revisions
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'''Understanding Federalist 10: translating the text & the big ideas''' | '''Understanding Federalist 10: translating the text & the big ideas''' | ||
See [[:Category:Federalist Papers|Federalist Papers entries (category page)]] | See also: | ||
* [[Federalist No. 51]] | |||
* [[:Category:Federalist Papers|Federalist Papers entries (category page)]] | |||
{{Federalist Papers}} | {{Federalist Papers}} | ||
== Federalist No. 10 background == | == Federalist No. 10 background == | ||
* Federalists | * Federalists 6-10 , in general, review the relationship between the states and with the proposed government | ||
* In Federalist 10, Madison discusses | ** especially the problem of "dissensions" (disagreement) between them | ||
** Federalist no 9: | * In Federalist 10, Madison discusses the problem in a democracy of faction and how an extensive government with limited government can avoid it | ||
** Federalist no. 6: '''Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no. 7: '''The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no. 8: '''The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no 9: '''The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no. 10: '''The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection''' (by Madison) | |||
==Summary | ==Federalist No. 10 Summary == | ||
* Madison discusses | [[File:Federalist No 10 school4schools-wiki.jpg|450px|right]] | ||
* Madison discusses the inherent problem in self-government of "faction" | |||
* he defines "faction" as any group that is opposed to another | |||
** factions consist of people joining together for common purpose and common self-interest | |||
* he identifies the problem with faction in that, if one faction seizes control of the government, it can use its powers to abuse the other factions or people | |||
* Madison identifies the only means to avoid faction as removing liberty | |||
** in other words, since faction is the result of groups using their liberties to seize power, the only way to stop it is to remove their liberties | |||
** i.e., the cause of faction is liberty | |||
* however, taking away liberties in order to remove faction is unacceptable | |||
* therefore, Madison proposes, instead of removing the <u>causes</u> of faction, to mitigate (reduce or control) its <u>effects</u> | |||
* Madison discussed the "republican principle" as: | |||
** popular government through representative democracy | |||
** separate branches | |||
** checks & balances | |||
* he points out that an "extensive" republic with divided and limited government will make it difficult for any one faction to seize complete control of it | |||
** he contrasts that with the history of small republics and states that succumbing to faction and end up abusing the rights of citizens | |||
* Madison's argument can also be seen as defense of limited government in a pluralistic, diverse society that is capable of self-rule and civil settlement of disputes | |||
* <u>key quotations</u>: | |||
** liberty is "''essential to political life''" | |||
** ''"liberty is to faction what air is to fire''" | |||
** the solution to the problem of faction is "''worse than the disease''" | |||
** "''the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed... [so the ] relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.''" | |||
* | * | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
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</big> | </big> | ||
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== Authorship == | == Authorship == | ||
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== "The extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage" == | == "The extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage" == | ||
* Madison argues that the advantages of a republic over a democracy are similar to those of a large over a small republic, those advantages being: | |||
** republics yield enlightened representatives who better attend the common good than the pure will of the people | |||
** large republics yield a larger pool of talent to draw from than small republics | |||
** democracies are subject to a majority faction | |||
** large republics have more and detached interests across their larger population and size (that will compete with each other) | |||
* Madison accepts the dangers of faction but states that the larger republic will offer "greater security" of the people's liberties (i.e., abuse by a dominant faction): | |||
** the larger Republic will produce "greater obstacles" to "concert" (joining and acting as one) of an "unjust and interested majority" | |||
|- | |- | ||
|<big>The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.</big> | |<big>The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.</big> | ||