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Federalist No. 10: Difference between revisions
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'''Understanding Federalist 10: translating the text & the big ideas''' | '''Understanding Federalist 10: translating the text & the big ideas''' | ||
See [[:Category:Federalist Papers|Federalist Papers entries (category page)]] | See also: | ||
* [[Federalist No. 51]] | |||
* [[:Category:Federalist Papers|Federalist Papers entries (category page)]] | |||
{{Federalist Papers}} | {{Federalist Papers}} | ||
== Federalist No. 10 background == | == Federalist No. 10 background == | ||
* Federalists | * Federalists 6-10 , in general, review the relationship between the states and with the proposed government | ||
* In Federalist 10, Madison discusses | ** especially the problem of "dissensions" (disagreement) between them | ||
** Federalist no 9: | * In Federalist 10, Madison discusses the problem in a democracy of faction and how an extensive government with limited government can avoid it | ||
** Federalist no. 6: '''Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no. 7: '''The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no. 8: '''The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no 9: '''The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection''' (by Hamilton) | |||
** Federalist no. 10: '''The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection''' (by Madison) | |||
==Summary | ==Federalist No. 10 Summary == | ||
* Madison discusses | [[File:Federalist No 10 school4schools-wiki.jpg|450px|right]] | ||
* Madison discusses the inherent problem in self-government of "faction" | |||
* he defines "faction" as any group that is opposed to another | |||
** factions consist of people joining together for common purpose and common self-interest | |||
* he identifies the problem with faction in that, if one faction seizes control of the government, it can use its powers to abuse the other factions or people | |||
* Madison identifies the only means to avoid faction as removing liberty | |||
** in other words, since faction is the result of groups using their liberties to seize power, the only way to stop it is to remove their liberties | |||
** i.e., the cause of faction is liberty | |||
* however, taking away liberties in order to remove faction is unacceptable | |||
* therefore, Madison proposes, instead of removing the <u>causes</u> of faction, to mitigate (reduce or control) its <u>effects</u> | |||
* Madison discussed the "republican principle" as: | |||
** popular government through representative democracy | |||
** separate branches | |||
** checks & balances | |||
* he points out that an "extensive" republic with divided and limited government will make it difficult for any one faction to seize complete control of it | |||
** he contrasts that with the history of small republics and states that succumbing to faction and end up abusing the rights of citizens | |||
* Madison's argument can also be seen as defense of limited government in a pluralistic, diverse society that is capable of self-rule and civil settlement of disputes | |||
* <u>key quotations</u>: | |||
** liberty is "''essential to political life''" | |||
** ''"liberty is to faction what air is to fire''" | |||
** the solution to the problem of faction is "''worse than the disease''" | |||
** "''the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed... [so the ] relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.''" | |||
* | * | ||
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== Authorship == | == Authorship == | ||
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|<big>It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.</big> | |<big>It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.</big> | ||
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== "The mean" -- how to balance representation == | |||
* Madison considers that | |||
** too many representatives ("electors") will alienate them from their constituents | |||
** too few representatives will attach them too closely to them and thus remove them from "national" (general) interests | |||
* Madison claims that the proposed Constitution will form a "happy combination" of national and local "interests" that will together yield a greater common interest | |||
|- | |- | ||
|<big>The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.</big> | |<big>The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.</big> | ||
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== The large republic == | |||
* the larger the republic, the more factions | |||
* the smaller the republic, the fewer factions | |||
** thus factions in the smaller republic will be more powerful | |||
* larger republics "Extend the sphere" and thus create multiple and competing interests and make it more difficult for them to act in "concert" | |||
* NOTE: here is the core argument in Federalist no. 10 that a large republic under the republican principle will prevent any single interest or faction from dominating | |||
|- | |- | ||
|<big>Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.</big> | |<big>Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.</big> | ||
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== "The extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage" == | |||
* Madison argues that the advantages of a republic over a democracy are similar to those of a large over a small republic, those advantages being: | |||
** republics yield enlightened representatives who better attend the common good than the pure will of the people | |||
** large republics yield a larger pool of talent to draw from than small republics | |||
** democracies are subject to a majority faction | |||
** large republics have more and detached interests across their larger population and size (that will compete with each other) | |||
* Madison accepts the dangers of faction but states that the larger republic will offer "greater security" of the people's liberties (i.e., abuse by a dominant faction): | |||
** the larger Republic will produce "greater obstacles" to "concert" (joining and acting as one) of an "unjust and interested majority" | |||
|- | |- | ||
|<big>The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.</big> | |<big>The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.</big> | ||
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== Effects of faction will be isolated in a large republic == | |||
* faction may and will control local areas and states | |||
** but due to the competing interests across the larger republic, those local factions will be isolated and have less influence over the rest of the country | |||
* Madison gives examples of the kinds of factions that may arise | |||
** religious sects | |||
** economic interests ("rage for paper money", "abolition of debts" and "equal division of property") | |||
* these factions/ interests will be isolated to their localities and unable to "taint" (influence) other areas | |||
|- | |- | ||
|<big>In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists</big> | |<big>In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists</big> | ||
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== The extent and structure of the Union == | |||
* Madison concludes that the "republican remedy" for the problems that other republics suffered across history will be avoided in "''the extent and proper structure of the Union''" | |||
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