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Federalist No. 51: Difference between revisions
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'''<big>In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.</big>''' | '''<big>In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them.</big>''' | ||
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== Separate & distinct powers for the preservation of liberty == | |||
Here Madison clarifies that the purpose of the separation of powers is for the "preservation of liberty." Following his argument in ''Federalist No. 1''0, in which he introduced the concept of allowing competition of factions (opposed groups) as opposed to fruitlessly suppressing them, which inherently violates liberties, In ''Federalist No.10'', Madison explored how the separation of powers protects the liberties of the people from abuse by government controlled by a single faction. | |||
Here he explains the mechanics (functions/processes) of the separation of powers and the necessary elements to it: | |||
* "each department should have a will of its own" | |||
* the people should be the source of appointments, not the departments themselves | |||
* each department should have "as little agency as possible" in the appointment of the members of the other, i.e., should have as little as possible say in the appointments of officials in other departments | |||
* however, it would be dangerous to allow the judiciary to appoint its own members, because otherwise the judiciary would have no accountability from the other departments | |||
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